Political Subjectivities and Local Nationalisms in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina
By Azra Hromadzic
One of the most commonly heard “complaints” about postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), made by policy-makers and academics alike, is that “ordinary Bosnians” vote for nationalists and, in that way, allow them to stay in power. While it is true that the nationalist parties have been dominating the political scene in postwar BiH, these facts and statistical data are used to make two very important and problematic claims: The first argument is that since Bosnians and Herzegovinians massively support the nationalist parties that started the war, this must mean that the majority of Bosnians and Herzegovinians are themselves nationalists (for an insightful critique of this position see Kurtović 2011). The second assertion is that any broader, cross-ethnic political and social articulations of common Bosnianhood are apolitical, nostalgic, invented and over-romanticized visions of Bosnianhood and/or are reflections of “impaired insights” on the side of “subjective” academics (see Hayden 2007). These two claims problematically accept statistical data as “true” reflections of political and social beliefs. Furthermore, these positions rest on a primordial, essentilizing and totalizing view of Bosnian and Herzegovinian “ethnic groups rooted in ethnic territories” (for a powerful critique of this rigid vision of multiculturalism, see Campbell 1999; Chandler 1999, and Gagnon n.d.).
Ethnic divisions are very important but not primordial nor exhaustive political formations in contemporary BiH. During and after the war ethnic cleavages were politicized and ethnonationally conceptualized; homogenous ethnicities rooted in ethnic territories emerged as the most powerful form of identity that structures perception, informs thought and experience, and organizes discourse and political action. Complicated and heterogeneous local notions of nationhood in BiH were flattened by ethnic nationalism and the consociational model of democracy, during and after the war. These changes, however, do not exhaust explanations given by ordinary people for why Bosnians vote in a certain way. In what follows, I use an ethnographic moment from my fieldwork to quickly explore ambivalent political subjectivities in postwar BiH, in order to complicate these assumptions.
The complicated relationship between nationhood and political subjectivity became apparent to me in the fall/winter of 2010-11 when I briefly returned to BiH, right before the municipal elections. I was picked up at the Zagreb Airport in Croatia by Samir[i], my distant relative. On our three hour long trip to BiH, Samir told me that his father, Husein, was now actively supporting the main nationalist Bosniak party—Stranka Demokratske Akcije or The Party of Democratic Action (SDA). I had a hard time believing that Husein would not only vote for SDA, but also announce this decision to the whole town: Husein had the reputation of an honest komunjara (derogative for an ex-communist), who, I remembered, lost his influential and prestigious managerial job at the beginning of the war because he refused to join the ranks of SDA. Remarkably, he remained influential in town during and after the war, regardless of his open critique of SDA politics; Husein always supported a moderate, self-proclaimed multi-ethnic Socijaldemokratsku Partiju Bosne i Hercegovine or The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP).
As we were driving to BiH, I recalled my last visit to Husein’s house, when we were sitting around the dining room table, talking about politics. At one point, Samir commented on, in his opinion, gloomy political prospects for the country’s future, and concluded by saying, “What could make people vote for non-nationalist [political] parties?” Without any hesitation, Husein responded, Pa za koga će drugog? Ovdje samo nacionalisti mogu da vladaju. (Who else can they vote for? Only nationalists can rule here). After only a few short moments, Husein elaborated, however: “[But] Narod je gladan (People are hungry). People are voting for the nationalists because they feel that there is no other option, no alternative, and that nationalists will provide them with jobs. But wait and see, narod će se dići (people will rise).” These different explanations provided by Husein in the past and his recent support of a Muslim nationalist party left me puzzled: Was Husein deceiving us the whole time? Or was he “simply” being pragmatic, by emphasizing that the only way to have political voice and social and economic security in contemporary BiH is to vote for nationalists? Was he possibly sarcastic, without me noticing? Was his response possibly an invocation of some better futurity, the one that is not “here”?
The next day, when I met Husein, I immediately asked him about his recent political activities. He smiled and said… “I knew that you would ask. Things have changed. I have high moral standards. Everyone in this town knows that—you cannot buy Husein, I am transparent. You know my story—I lost several jobs [at the beginning of war] because I refused to join SDA and play their dirty game. They tried to put so much pressure on me.” Husein paused for a second and then continued. “But…you see…while SDP at the national-level still has some good people in its ranks, here, in our town, it is so dirty, so rotten. You would not believe their games. Take the mayor, for example. We had so many hopes [when he was elected]… But look, he is the worst of them all. He is friends with mafia, imagine! He is so corrupt—he bought two new houses at the [Croatian] coast. I cannot support these people. And SDA [in town] has changed. They have many new, young and educated people leading the party politics. See, I think they really want to do good things for this town. And I have to think pragmatically—they [SDA] are also better for me. The mayor already betrayed me, you know the story when he promised all those things to my organization but never delivered his promises. You know me, I hate lies. So I will vote and openly support SDA and I will tell everyone to vote against the mayor and his followers. But, on the national-level, I will still support and vote for SDP. I might even vote for Naša stranka (Our Party)[ii] at the national level—I like how young and thoughtful those people are.”
Husein’s political pragmatism is a profound critique of those approaches to Balkan politics which take a static view of ordinary people’s political behavior, assuming that if people vote for nationalist parties as their representatives, they are themselves nationalists (Kurtović 2011). Husein’s case points to a more complicated political subjectivity that escapes classification into nationalist vs. trans-nationalist and anti-nationalist frameworks. In addition, his discussion of morality is deeply interwoven with his life under socialism, the experience of which significantly impacts his ideas of ethical behavior. Husein’s seemingly contradictory and “eclectic” voting patterns thus make sense when placed within the context of Husein’s everyday life and his multiple identifications, pasts loyalties and future orientations, relationships and political visions. Given this complexity, it is understandable that Husein continually articulated his despise of ethnic nationalism, his nostalgia for Yugoslavia, and his support for a united Bosnia while, at the same time, he supported SDA at the local level. Husein’s actions thus illustrate how ordinary people use common logic and available resources to enact, de-enact and re-enact nationalist and anti-nationalist stances, without seeing their actions as contradictory and/or immoral, and without ever “becoming” indoctrinated into (anti)nationalisms.[iii]
This brief moment in the field reminded me of an ever-growing need to ethnographically grasp and anthropologically untangle the complicated and ambivalent nature of “the political” that powerfully shapes behaviors of “ordinary” people in postwar BiH and beyond.
References cited:
Arnautović, Suad. Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini ’90. Sarajevo: Promokult, 1996. Print.
Arsenijević, Damir. “Protiv Oportunisticke Kritike.” http://eipcp.net/transversal/0208/arsenijevic/bhs. (Nov. 2007) Web May 31, 2012.
Bieber, Florian. Postwar Bosnia: Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector. London: Palgrave, 2006. Print.
Bougarel, Xavier. Helms, Elissa and Gur Duijzings, eds. The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Postwar Society. Aldershot: Ashgate 2007, Print.
Campbell, David. “Apartheid Cartography: the Political Anthropology and Spatial Effects of International Diplomacy in Bosnia.” Political Geography 18:395-435, 1999. Print.
Chandler, David. Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto Press, 1999. Print.
Gagnon, V.P. Jr. “Liberal Multiculturalism and Post-Dayton Bosnia: Solution or Problem? ” Unpublished Manuscript, Print.
Kurtović, Larisa. “What is a Nationalist? Some thoughts on the question from Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Anthropology of Eastern Europe Review 29(2):242-253, 2011. Print.
[i] All names are pseudonyms.
[ii] Naša stranka is a mutli-ethnic political party which challenges the dominance of nationalist parties in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian political system.
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